Wednesday, November 20, 2013

Nothing, In Particular

Socrates and Theaetetus have a brief discussion about the idea of non-being and whether or not one could even think about it. Ultimately, Socrates decides that it is incomprehensible since to think about it, one would need a term of being. This got me contemplating on nothing in particular.

One of the problems with nothing as a concept (and infinity as well) is that it must be bound linguistically to be relevant to human beings. But the very thing that gives us the ability to discuss nothingness also makes it a something rather than a nothing. The very act of defining it makes it a non-nothing. One cannot truly type the concept of nothing, as the word itself is definable as at the very least, a word. Whereas this defining places a lower limit on nothing, it does the same, but with an upper limit to infinity.

Aside from the problems faced by philosophers of mind and linguistics, the discussion of nothing ties in nicely with Plato's ideas of the Forms and soul. It is natural that the soul exist both before and after life, as it cannot slip into nothingness. If it were to do so, either it would be unknowable (and we therefore would know nothing of it), or it would still be definable in its lack-of-soul-ness (as opposed to soullessness which is a problem nearly unique to the legal field). Likewise, the Forms must exist, because without them, a quality would not be readily knowable, as it would be coming out of nothing. It may be perceivable in nature, but for Plato, without the Form, there would be no quality to define. This is almost replayed by Berkeley in that things exist so long as they are in the mind of God.

While much of this may seem tangential, it provided another link in the chain for my understanding of the inner workings of Plato. Unless my opinion is wrong, in which case, I will cover that in my presentation.

Wednesday, November 13, 2013

A Face Only a Philosopher Could Love

What I most want to analyze in the opening of the dialogue is Theaetetus' comparison to Socrates. Most youths that we have encountered thus far have been described in terms of beauty and the desirability that said beauty brings. This is not so with Theaetetus. He is described as being near the looks of Socrates, though less so. While this would probably be deemed an insult by most, because it is one of the so rare physical descriptions in Plato's anthology, it must be of some importance.

If Forrest Gump suffered from Socrates' looks, he would have said, "I am not a pretty man." This is why it is so intriguing that Theaetetus is described as looking like Socrates. I believe it to be a comparison to their respective levels of wisdom. Though both have been forsaken by the triviality of corporeal beauty, Socrates is the uglier of the two, and the wiser.

I would also like to toss around the idea that as Theaetetus is described as have features slightly more beautiful (less ugly) than Socrates, he is on his way to them. That is to say, could the reference to their looks be a way of saying Theaetetus is travelling along the same journey Socrates took to his current level of wisdom? Or is this an allegory of how Socrates came to be there? Either way, when placed in conjunction with the comment about how Socrates predicted great things for Theaetetus, it is not hard to draw a conclusion that Socrates was either projecting that Theaetetus would do well and become like him, or that Theaetetus would achieve great things because he was like Socrates.


Thursday, November 7, 2013

Hemlock, Stock, and Two Smoking Points to Make

I want to focus on two particular aspects: the first being Socrates' treatment of inevitability and the second, his final words.

Inevitability insofar as this dialogue is concerned, distinguishes itself quite potently from the modern opinion of it. Modern society seems to have an obsession with control. It can be seen in the frequent checking of communications, the desire to rise to the top of whatever field in which one finds one's self, and even in the frequent checking of clocks. Each one of these examples is a way in which we as individuals can be sure that things are not happening without our knowledge, and therefore without our input and control. We are so obsessed with control that we compulsively check the time, as if the time's changing is something that is influenced by our knowledge of it. We want to know when the minute hand will next tick, as if it is waiting for our approval. This can be contrasted with the ancient view in which people are not so individualistic. Socrates preaches a contentment. He seeks wisdom for wisdom's sake, but he is content to be poor, and to be good enough at his trade to survive. He is a part of a society, and knows that entails not being in control of anything beyond himself. When it comes time to die, he is accepting, because he has relinquished control. The inevitable means something will happen; we in the modern world just fear things happening outside of our control.
Our fear of the inevitable comes from our misunderstanding of what is enough. To control ourselves, to pursue wisdom, and to sustain ourselves are all enough. In the end, we will die, and that will be enough. No amount of anxiety will change that. We could do worse than to adopt Socrates' attitude on this.

One other peculiarity that I found was in Socrates' final words. I won't make the argument that he chose Asclepius because hemlock was his cure for life. Instead, I would like to say that it seems from this passage that to be just is to pay one's due. Despite all of the argument in the Republic, here we have Socrates at the end of his life, instructing someone to pay back a debt. The fact that it is a god shows piety's connection to justice. Maybe the choice for Asclepius is to indicate that Plato is righting his former misjudgement of what justice is. Or maybe the fact that Socrates is dying shows that the debt balance view of justice belonged to Socrates and now we can move past that to healing it.
Or Crito is charged to be the healer of men.