Plato's discussion of the different types of government in Book VIII caught my eye the most for several reasons, the greatest of which is how he places avarice at the root of the decline of each government.

Given that Athenians are known for democracy, it is also striking that Plato places that among the most easily corrupted forms of government. However, following the root cause of corruption, one can easily see how the democracy is more open to be corrupted. By allowing the few to influence the votes of the many, democracy is compromised. In the view of Plato, democracy is only as good as its citizens. When there is inequity, the lower class becomes dependent on the upper class, creating a situation in which they either compromise integrity for needs, or suffer for integrity. In Plato's eyes, they will almost assuredly compromise. But behind this compromise, there is greed driving the upper class. They are the ones who can afford to help, but their greed will extend beyond the monetary and lead into a hunger for power. This contrasts greatly with the typical egalitarian view of democracy as the tyrant slayer.

When viewed in contrast with the Timocracy of Sparta, it becomes even more peculiar from an Athenian stand point. Given that it is the Spartan way, one would think that it would be less favorable. However, it is the ideal situation for a guardian. one must earn his way there. The downfall comes when one ceases to prove his merit and sits on his laurels.

The underlying issue with both of these contrasting forms of government are the ways in which corruption comes to exist. It is not inherent in the workings or the structure of the political system, but comes about as a flaw within the people. Plato seems to rail against complacency and the desire for manipulations of others. When one looks at what makes a good philosopher in his eyes, it is easy to find other examples. The philosopher in the cave can never be complacent to have seen the light without sharing it, and the manipulating influences are exposed as mere shadows. For Plato, the good soul is content with his station, but never complacent. He does not desire beyond his means or what he deserves, but he does strive toward wisdom. More than anything, the philosopher sees other people as souls which are not to be mistreated.

Spelunking

What strikes me most about the allegory of the cave is the layering involved. While I won't go too much into detail, for fear of later being redundant during my presentation, in the one individual's journey, three are taken.

 First, and most common is the social; Socrates narrates the journey of any given Athenian-- or indeed any given person-- through the levels of increasing socialization, ranging from familial instruction to acclimation to the culture, and even formal education before moving onto questioning and developing the culture and society.

Secondly is the journey of the soul (which will also be referred to as the spiritual journey). Here we see a soul brought into darkness-- amnesis-- then shown the fire which makes it aware of its state of ignorance, before beginning its ascent to anamnesis, all the while stumbling as its level of enlightenment changes. Eventually, the soul is able to ascend to the realm of the Forms in its reckoning with the entirety of the sun. At this point, to go backward back into darkness is not only a descent, but as blurring and numbing as the ascent originally was.

Thirdly, there is the journey of the philosopher. One begins unaware that there could be a reality other than the one being experienced. It is in questioning and being unable to accommodate something new in one's previous system that reveals the flaws of one's perceived reality (such as the inability to explain the objects and fire as a part of the world of shadows). From this point, one begins on a ascent of inquiry, all the while stumbling and squinting to discern what is and what is not real. The ultimate goal is to understand the Forms, but in doing so, one must trek long and hard, all the while resisting the urge to become complacent in the degree of light that one's wisdom finds itself until the sun is finally grasped. At this point, to go back and accept the images and reflections of opinion and assumption of the old reality would be a dizzying miasmic blur.

The last and to the philosopher, the most important piece is the charge. Socrates sends the enlightened individual back down into the cave to enlighten his fellows. While it is a hard trip back, the philosopher must cling to the wisdom he has gained and resist the urge to acclimate himself to the darkness. His duty is to lead others out, not fall back into their place.

 When one takes a step back from the allegory and looks at the narrative as a whole, this charge is executed by Socrates in his own descent from the enlightenment (or at least the perceived enlightenment) of Athens, down into the Piraeus: down from the upper echelons to the common folk: another moment of Plato's framing Socrates as the ideal philosopher-- never complacent, and always dragging others to the light.

Techne-ing Over Sophia: The Dark Side of Plato

I would like to focus on a point that has—until the end of Book II—been left unanswered. Thrasymachus raises quite the deep cutting point that to be just does not really seem to have any advantage over being unjust. In fact, not only do the unjust get ahead in their pursuits, but the gods even give them fewer toils and troubles. Since up to the ending of Book II, the only potential answer to Thrasymachus has been that the afterlife may be better (though in other dialogues Plato/Socrates admit that the afterlife is a mystery), the issue deserves further thought.

The idea of justice as an obstacle to pursuits that is shed for greater benefits seems at its surface to be an ethical issue. When taking into account other voices in the dialogue and their claiming justice as a necessary evil to societal life—i.e. a social contract theory—it becomes something in the realm of political philosophy. However, the objections raised to justice do more than just strike at any one realm of philosophy; they cut it to the core.

One can easily see the damage that this position could inflict to the entire realm of ethics. Not only does acting justly lie at the base of most ethical dilemmas, but to treat any ethical value or virtue as something which provides no benefit really takes all the wind out of the sails of the ship of ethics. It leaves it a floating monument of inquiry, but still something that will not take anyone anywhere. If there is no reason to practice ethics, then it is hard to make a case for ethics to exist. Though perhaps one could argue that it is better for people in general to behave ethically.

Moving on to this Machiavellian (though anachronistically so) view that although one can get ahead by being unjust, the whole falls behind if everyone is, one is confronted with a sort of prisoners’ dilemma; sure, being unjust will give better pay outs, but if everyone else is unjust, no one gets anywhere. This situation gives some credence to why justice should be deemed a good, but it still does not vindicate justice. Instead, it leaves it as a statute rather than a virtue, and statutes hold no inherent power.

Justice, goodness, and a select few other abstract concepts lie at the core of philosophy, if philosophy really is to be considered the art of living well (via the pursuit and love of wisdom). However, if one of these concepts—in this case justice—is to be something which does not hold to be an inherently worthy pursuit but rather a means to an end, then all of philosophy takes a blow. It leaves sophia a sort of side show to techne. To say that the utter uselessness of philosophy would lead to a sort of nihilism would be to put it lightly. Nihilism itself is a philosophical stance that at least is arrived at through the study of philosophy and the pursuit of wisdom. Without philosophy being at least a worthy endeavour, only skills survive. The world of the wise and ethical dies, and the world of the business major is left to rise.

So while the importance of justice to the world of philosophy is here underlined, what is left unsettled is why philosophy is so important, or even whether it is a real and true pursuit. The answer must lie past Book II.