Nothing, In Particular

Socrates and Theaetetus have a brief discussion about the idea of non-being and whether or not one could even think about it. Ultimately, Socrates decides that it is incomprehensible since to think about it, one would need a term of being. This got me contemplating on nothing in particular.

One of the problems with nothing as a concept (and infinity as well) is that it must be bound linguistically to be relevant to human beings. But the very thing that gives us the ability to discuss nothingness also makes it a something rather than a nothing. The very act of defining it makes it a non-nothing. One cannot truly type the concept of nothing, as the word itself is definable as at the very least, a word. Whereas this defining places a lower limit on nothing, it does the same, but with an upper limit to infinity.

Aside from the problems faced by philosophers of mind and linguistics, the discussion of nothing ties in nicely with Plato's ideas of the Forms and soul. It is natural that the soul exist both before and after life, as it cannot slip into nothingness. If it were to do so, either it would be unknowable (and we therefore would know nothing of it), or it would still be definable in its lack-of-soul-ness (as opposed to soullessness which is a problem nearly unique to the legal field). Likewise, the Forms must exist, because without them, a quality would not be readily knowable, as it would be coming out of nothing. It may be perceivable in nature, but for Plato, without the Form, there would be no quality to define. This is almost replayed by Berkeley in that things exist so long as they are in the mind of God.

While much of this may seem tangential, it provided another link in the chain for my understanding of the inner workings of Plato. Unless my opinion is wrong, in which case, I will cover that in my presentation.