Techne-ing Over Sophia: The Dark Side of Plato

I would like to focus on a point that has—until the end of Book II—been left unanswered. Thrasymachus raises quite the deep cutting point that to be just does not really seem to have any advantage over being unjust. In fact, not only do the unjust get ahead in their pursuits, but the gods even give them fewer toils and troubles. Since up to the ending of Book II, the only potential answer to Thrasymachus has been that the afterlife may be better (though in other dialogues Plato/Socrates admit that the afterlife is a mystery), the issue deserves further thought.

The idea of justice as an obstacle to pursuits that is shed for greater benefits seems at its surface to be an ethical issue. When taking into account other voices in the dialogue and their claiming justice as a necessary evil to societal life—i.e. a social contract theory—it becomes something in the realm of political philosophy. However, the objections raised to justice do more than just strike at any one realm of philosophy; they cut it to the core.

One can easily see the damage that this position could inflict to the entire realm of ethics. Not only does acting justly lie at the base of most ethical dilemmas, but to treat any ethical value or virtue as something which provides no benefit really takes all the wind out of the sails of the ship of ethics. It leaves it a floating monument of inquiry, but still something that will not take anyone anywhere. If there is no reason to practice ethics, then it is hard to make a case for ethics to exist. Though perhaps one could argue that it is better for people in general to behave ethically.

Moving on to this Machiavellian (though anachronistically so) view that although one can get ahead by being unjust, the whole falls behind if everyone is, one is confronted with a sort of prisoners’ dilemma; sure, being unjust will give better pay outs, but if everyone else is unjust, no one gets anywhere. This situation gives some credence to why justice should be deemed a good, but it still does not vindicate justice. Instead, it leaves it as a statute rather than a virtue, and statutes hold no inherent power.

Justice, goodness, and a select few other abstract concepts lie at the core of philosophy, if philosophy really is to be considered the art of living well (via the pursuit and love of wisdom). However, if one of these concepts—in this case justice—is to be something which does not hold to be an inherently worthy pursuit but rather a means to an end, then all of philosophy takes a blow. It leaves sophia a sort of side show to techne. To say that the utter uselessness of philosophy would lead to a sort of nihilism would be to put it lightly. Nihilism itself is a philosophical stance that at least is arrived at through the study of philosophy and the pursuit of wisdom. Without philosophy being at least a worthy endeavour, only skills survive. The world of the wise and ethical dies, and the world of the business major is left to rise.

So while the importance of justice to the world of philosophy is here underlined, what is left unsettled is why philosophy is so important, or even whether it is a real and true pursuit. The answer must lie past Book II.